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Introduction 
Politicians in developing countries frequently claim that 
free financial markets may not necessarily promote socially 
desirable activities and serve distributional goals. This claim 
has been the rationale for the tight regulation of formal 
financial activity. Although most of these regulatory efforts 
have yielded disappointing results, politicians have been rarely 
concerned with how specific policies affect the financial 
market's size and performance. As a result, finance continues to 
be heavily regulated and distorting financial policies stand in 
the way of economic growth and stability. Promoters of 
liberal iza ti on cl aim, on the other hand, that f inane i al markets 
that operate freely may mobilize and allocate domestic resources 
more successfully (Shaw; McKinnon, 1973; Gonzalez-Vega, 1986); 
Blejer and Sagar!). 
This paper explores the impact of regulation on the 
structure and performance of financial markets in Honduras during 
the 1975-83 p~riod. The main tool of analysis is the estimation 
of a bank profit function, in order to derive conclusions about 
market efficiency. The Honduran authorities have argued that the 
small size of the market and the high concentration of the funds 
mobilized in a few large banks have resulted in the poor 
performance of the banking system. Politicians cite as evidence 
of these deficiencies the concentration of banking operations in 
the urban areas, the high transaction costs incurred in the 
provision of financial services, and the substantial profits of 
the financial industry (Gonzalez-Vega and Camacho). In response 
to these actual or presumed shortcomings, the Honduran 
authorities have actively intervened in financial markets. 
Rather than improving market performance, however, regulation has 
introduced allocative distortions and has created opportunities 
for rent-seeking by powerful interest groups. This paper 
examines the behavior of Honduran banks and the structure of this 
country's financial markets, in order to explore the validity of 
the assumptions behind the ostensible objectives of the Honduran 
regulators. 
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The Honduran Financial System 
With a population of over 4.5 million, Honduras has one of 
the lowest per capita incomes in Latin America (less than US$700 
in 1986). This small, open economy exports primarily bananas and 
coffee. Output growth, therefore, is significantly influenced by 
fluctuations in the country's supply and in the international 
prices for these two commodities. Income levels and fluctuations, 
in turn, influence the demand for and supply of financial 
services. The boom in world coffee prices, a recovery in banana 
production after hurricane damage in 1975, and a surge in public 
investment resulted in an annual real rate of growth of GDP of 7 
percent during 1976-79. Declining prices for coffee and other 
exports, higher oil import values, and the service of the growing 
foreign debt led to a sharp economic decline during 1980-83 (see 
Table 1). Fiscal deficits financed with domestic credit from the 
Central Bank and with external debt fueled inflation. These 
problems were accentuated by capital flight, estimated at U.S. 
$500 million, and by a reduction of foreign financing for the 
private sector (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984; Ruhl). 
The Honduran financial system exhibits features pointed out 
by McKinnon (1980) for developing economies: (1) a limited issue 
of pr irnary securities (bonds and stock) by indi v 1 dual economic 
units and a greater reliance on self-finance when compared to 
more developed economies; (2) most of the primary securities 
issued by non--financial firms are acquired by finan-cial 
intermediaries; and (3) most of the financial assets held by the 
public are liabilities of the banking system. Therefore, the 
banks play a key role in the channelling of savings towards 
investment and in the financing of working capital. 
By 1975, 13 private commercial banks, 6 savings and loan 
associations, and 3 public development banks participated in the 
market. Most commercial banks had been es ta bl i shed during the 
1960s. Since then the banking system experienced a sustained 
expansion, both in terms of the number of institutions and of the 
number of bank branches, that lasted through 1978. The 
stagnation of the Honduran economy and the f ai 1 ure of a major 
bank (BANFINAN) led to reduced entry into the market after 1978. 
While the rapid increase in the number of market 
participants and of bank offices reflected sustained financial 
deepening during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the expansion 
of the branch network also reflected the need for the banks to 
rely on non-interest forms of competition in order to capture a 
larger share of the market for deposits, particularly when 
inflation accelerated after the mid-1970s, and real interest 
rates became negative (Camacho and Gonzalez-Vega). The number of 
branches increased from 198 in 1971 to 300. in 1983. Most of this 
growth resulted from new branches of the private commercial banks 
and the savings and loan associations. Few of the new branches, 
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however, were full-service branches (credit-granting as well as 
deposit-gathering). Rather, most of these branches had authority 
for deposit mobilization only. More and more-conveniently 
located branches reduced transaction costs for potential clients 
and allowed the corresponding banks a competitive edge in the 
market for deposits. Interest-rate competition was important, as 
well, and represented a major determinant of substantial changes 
in market shares among the commercial banks. 
By 1983 the three largest commercial banks held 45 percent 
of the total assets and 40 percent of the deposits mobilized from 
the public by the banking system. This reflected the substantial 
reduction in market concentration that had taken place during the 
previous two decades (Camacho and Gonzalez-Vega) . In addition, 
important ownership, directorate, and financial links among the 
commercial banks and savings and loan institutions, and among 
financial institutions and non-bank productive enterprises have 
characterized the Honduran system. 
Honduran Financial Policies 
Financial institutions in Honduras are regulated by the 
Board of Directors of the Central Bank. This Board includes 
representatives of private financial institutions, the public 
development banks, social constituencies, and the government. 
Through time the Board has enjoyed relative but declining 
autonomy from the Executive branch. 
Financial policies in Honduras have reflected the use and 
abuse of arguments for intervention. These policies have 
included interest-rate controls, restrictions on the range of 
services that different intermediaries may provide, requirements 
on the amounts and ways in which banking institutions maintain 
reserves, and entry conditions. Central Bank regulation has also 
included portfolio restrictions, in attempts to force private 
banks to allocate a proportion of their portfolio to specific 
activities and groups, frequently at below-market interest rates, 
as well as targeted rediscounting schemes and special credit 
programs, frequently financed by international donors. In 
addition, on the basis of considerations about market failure and 
the need to promote socially desirable activities, Honduran 
politicians have strongly supported the establishment of public 
financial agencies in order to promote, among others, 
agricultural, housing, and industrial activities. Finally, the 
direct financing of public-sector expenditures, through the 
inflation tax, government bonds eligible for bank reserve 
requirements, and the explicit or implicit crowding out of the 
private sector in domestic credit portfolios has reflected an 
outright fiscal purpose of intervention. 
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Taxation, inflation, confiscatory reserve requirements, 
interest-rate ceilings, and distorted foreign-exchange rates have 
not only been instruments to limit the profits of financial 
intermediaries, but have also reduced incentives for deposit 
mobilization, resulted in smaller formal financial markets, and 
limited the possibilities for intermediaries to exploit scale and 
scope economies and to adopt new financial technologies. 
Financial markets, however, have adjusted to this market 
regulation, as the intermediaries have strived to maintain their 
profitability. The importance of implicit prices illustrates 
these attempts to circumvent regulations. Implicit pricing, 
however, requires the use of additional resources in order to 
complete transactions and to counter the implicit taxes or enjoy 
the implicit subsidies. Nevertheless, despite these higher 
costs, regulatory avoidance allows the intermediaries to remain 
viable in the face of repressive interventions and reduces the 
efficiency losses that result from distorting controls. As an 
evasion mechanism, the proliferation of non-regulated financial 
intermediaries usually increases transaction costs and risks, but 
it also reduces the degree of distortion and restores access to 
financial services for excluded clientele (Gonzalez-Vega, 1986). 
Financial Market Efficiency 
Concerns with efficiency in financial markets have been a 
major argument for intervention. At least four dimensions of 
efficiency have been explored in the literature: the arbitrage of 
information, the valuation of assets and liabilities, the 
provision of stores of value and inflation hedges, and functional 
efficiency (Tobin). Functional efficiency, which is the focus of 
this paper, is related to the main functions of finance: the 
administration of the payments mechanism, the intermediation 
between savers and investors, and the management of risk and 
insurance. 
This paper is concerned with both technical and price 
efficiency. A firm is considered technically more efficient than 
another when, given the same quantities of measurable inputs Xi, 
it consistently produces higher levels of output. On the other 
hand, a firm is considered to be price-efficient if it maximizes 
profits. In a competitive environment, given two firms with 
varying degrees of technical and price efficiency but facing the 
same level of prices, the firm with higher profits is considered 
to be the economically more efficient firm (Lau and Yotopoulos, 
1971). Divergences between private and social costs, common in 
developing countries, are not considered here. Although the 
authorities may attempt to correct for such distortions, we 
assume that they do not have the power and administrative 
capacity to do so in Honduras. Rather, intervention in this 
country has mostly been the result of rent-seeking activities and 
of efforts to accumulate market and political power by various 
interest groups. 
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A Model of the Banking Firm 
The nature of the production technology and of the 
production decisions of financial institutions shapes the 
relationships between regulation, market structure, and industry 
performance. There are two basic ways to model banking firms: 
the cost-function approach and the profit-function approach. 
Bank cost functions have been used more extensively, but they 
focus primarily on operating or technical efficiency (Cuevas, 
Chavez-Presa, Srinivasan). The regulators, however, are 
frequently more concerned with price efficiency. The proponents 
of the profit function argue that their approach allows for wider 
possibilities to explore these two dimensions of economic 
efficiency --price and technical efficiency (Hancock; McFadden; 
Mullineaux). 
The profit-function approach is adopted in this paper as the 
framework for the analysis of the Honduran banking system. 
Financial institutions are conceptualized as multi-input, 
multi-output firms. Bank technology is characterized by the 
transformation function T(X,Xk), where X is the vector of 
variable-input and output amounts and Xk is the level of fixed 
inputs. The distinction between outputs and inputs is not clear 
cut in the case of banks. Deposits, for example, may be viewed 
as an input into the production of loans and other investments, 
or as the output in the production of services valuable to· the 
bank customers. In the present case, however, there is no need 
for an a priori classification of inputs and outputs, since 
prices are the arguments in the profit function. 
Let u represent the vector of user costs of goods and 
services X, as perceived by the suppliers of inputs or buyers of 
bank outputs. Banks perceive services that generate revenues as 
outputs and services that generate costs as inputs. Then: 
if ui < O for outputs, and 
if ui > O for inputs, for i=l,2,3, .. ,n. ( 1) 
Banks are assumed to maximize profits. If banks are price 
takers in both input and output markets and the profit function 
is concave, a profit-function dual to T(X,Xk) is given by: 
s.t. T(X,Xk) = 0. ( 2 ) 
where p is a vector of variable-input and output prices and 
prices are defined as: 
for i=l,2, ... ,n. ( 3 ) 
I 
t 
f 
l. 
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l 
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I 
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Using Hotelling's lemma, functions for the demand for 
variable inputs and the supply of outputs are given as: 
for i=l,2, ... ,n, ( 4) 
These functions can also be expressed as: 
dlnn I dlnpi ( 5) 
The characteristics of the banking technology may be 
identified indirectly, through an estimation of the profit 
function, in view of the formal duality between profit and 
production functions. The values of the parameters obtained may 
then be used to test hypotheses concerning economies of scale, 
differences in economic efficiency across institutional types, 
and the impact of regulation on economic efficiency (Lau, 1969; 
Mullineaux). The approach also allows for substitution 
possibilities between inputs and between outputs, which is an 
important characteristic of production functions in multi-input, 
multi-output firms. In addition, with this approach it is 
possible to consider firms that participate in several or all 
markets and to study a wide array of market configurations. 
Furthermore, the use of prices as variables in the profit 
function permits the inclusion of policy instruments in the 
construction of proxies, in order to study the impact of 
regulation on bank profitability. Dummy variables may also be 
introduced in order to differentiate among institutional types 
that are subject to different levels of intended regulation and 
to determine whether or not differences in efficiency may be 
actually explained by regulation. 
Functional Form 
The most flexible functional form that allowed the 
estimation of a profit function on the basis of available data 
for the Honduran banking system was the translogarithmic. The 
advantage of a translogarithmic function is that, by allowing 
interaction coefficients between the exogenous variables (X,Xk), 
it makes less-restrictive assumptions than the Cobb-Douglas 
specification about substitution possibilities across inputs and 
outputs. This is particularly important when modelling financial 
firms, since some liabilities are, at the same time, outputs and 
intermediate inputs in the production of other financial 
services. The use of a translogarithmic function assumes that 
the profit function takes the following form: 
ln ( n) 
( 6) 
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In this case supply and demand functions take the following 
form: 
The assumption that firms are price takers can then be 
tested by the sign and significance of parameter estimates for 
input and output prices. Nonsignificant estimates would indicate 
that banks are not price takers in that particular market. 
Nonsignificant coefficients may also result, however, from 
inadequate proxies for the price variables and when the firm is 
not a profit maximizer. This was a possibility with the 
development banks in Honduras. The extent of competition may 
vary across products and across financial institutions, if 
differences in relative price efficiency across product lines are 
observed. 
Elasticity estimates for outputs are expected to be 
positively signed, as an increase in the price for a particular 
output, ceteris paribus, should increase a bank's total profits. 
Negative signs are expected for inputs, since an increase in the 
cost of a particular input, ceteris paribus, should reduce 
profits. 
The Data 
The measurement of profits, variable-input and output prices 
and amounts, and fixed-input levels for Honduran banks was 
subject to major data and specification problems. The data on 
the bank's simplified income statement and balance sheet came 
from the records of the Central Bank of Honduras. Given the 
limited information disclosed, little disaggregation of the data 
was possible. Loans, for example, were aggregated into one 
single category. In addition, while the revenues and costs used 
to determine the proxies for prices were flow measures, the 
amounts of deposits and loans used for the same purpose were 
stocks. Moreover, the small number of institutions did not allow 
sufficient degrees of freedom to permit year-to-year estimations 
across the banks. Instead, a pooled time-series and cross-
section estimation was necessary. Quarterly averages of monthly 
data were used. 
Data problems reflected as well a larger role of implicit 
prices and greater incentives to manipulate accounting 
statements, both frequent responses to regulation. In general, 
the traditional indicators of performance of financial 
institutions reflected the limitations of the accounting data, 
more acute in developing than in developed economies (Camacho). 
Since the empirical specification of the profit function requires 
the use of economic rather than accounting financial data, the 
link between economic and financial variables was given by the 
user costs derived for all balance-sheet items by Hancock. 
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The assets considered in the economic balance sheet were: 
(a) cash (Xl), which included reserves against demand and time 
deposits, and (b) loans and investments (X4), which were 
aggregated into one category. Financial assets were obtained as 
the sum of Xl and X4, less nondeposit and borrowed funds. Total 
assets were obtained as the sum of financial assets plus fixed 
assets. Financial liabilities were obtained as the sum of: (a) 
demand deposits (X2), (b) savings and time deposits (X3), and 
(c) fixed assets (Xk). Financial liabilities must equal 
financial assets. Total capital was obtained as financial capital 
(financial assets-X2-X3) plus physical capital and it represented 
the shareholders' equity. Off-balance-sheet sources of value 
should have been included, but information about their magnitude 
was not available. 
Proxies 
Inputs and outputs were measured in terms of a numeraire. 
Each Lempira disbursed as a loan or as an investment had a unit 
price. It was assumed that the bank had the right to claim the 
initial unit plus interest and services charges, such as fees and 
commissions, minus losses due to default and other premiums. 
User costs for outputs were defined as: 
( 8) 
where ri is the explicit interest rate charged, net of service 
charges and a provision for default losses, and R is the discount 
rate. Implicit interest should have been included in the 
computation of user costs, but information about its probable 
magnitude was not available. Similarly, for inputs and 
liabilities user costs were defined as: 
(9) 
where ri is the explicit interest revenue, including service 
charges, Ki is the reserve requirement, and (1-Ki) represents the 
fraction of liabilities that can be used as an input in the 
production of assets. Unit cost can be transformed into: 
(10) 
where bi is the bank's service charge and si is the bank's 
service cost. The role of regulation was explored through the 
evaluation of the impact of each instrument on bank 
profitability. Given the choice of user costs as the proxies for 
prices, the statutory level of each regulatory instrument was 
then used as a control variable, in order to assess its impact on 
price elasticities and on profitability. 
Table 2 shows the choice of proxies 
outputs included in the profit function. 
for the 
This 
inputs and 
ta:ble also 
I 
I 
I 
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indicates the impact of changes in the control variable on each 
proxy. The rate of inflation, used here as the discount rate is 
represented by p; Ri the statutory level of reserve requirements; 
d is the explicit interest rate paid on savings and time 
deposits; ri is the explicit interest rate charged on loans; and 
w represents the level of bank wages. The sign of the impact of 
an increase in the level of the control variable on the price is 
also reported in Table 2. 
Scale was measured as a combination of the volume of 
services provided and the amount of fixed inputs used, following 
the suggestion of recent studies of economies of scale in banking 
(Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey). The available data included 
the volume of loans and deposits, but not the number and size 
distribution of the accounts. This restriction made it 
impossible to explore proxy sensitivity with respect to 
alternative measures of output. Information on the number and 
size of branches all owed, on the other hand, an ex pl oration of 
the impact of network expansion on scale economies. Branch 
expansion may be considered al so as a proxy for implicit-price 
competition, which seems to have been important in Honduras. 
Test Methodology 
The conclusions of recent research on test methodology were 
used to determine the order of the misspecification tests to be 
conducted (Phillips and McCabe, 1983, 1984). First, it has been 
found that the adoption of a more general model makes it possible 
to identify the correct model specification through the 
imposition and test of restrictions. Second, tests of structural 
change should be conducted prior to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity being tested and corrected if necessary. This 
procedure avoids conclusions about serial correlation or 
heteroskedasticity, which may not be present but that are 
reflected by the tests because of the failure to consider 
structural change. Third, a test of serial correlation should be 
conducted prior to a test of heteroskedasticity. Then, if serial 
correlation is present, either a Goldfeld-Quandt test or a 
Glejser test for heteroskedasticity may be more robust if applied 
to a Chrocane-Orcutt transformed model. 
Estimation of the Profit Function 
A three-stage least-squares estimation was undertaken in 
order to increase the efficiency of the estimator. This 
procedure makes a clear interpretation of each parameter estimate 
still possible. The intermediate two-stage estimates increase 
efficiency by eliminating the correlation between the exogenous 
variables and the disturbance term. The third-stage estimation 
further increases the efficiency of the estimator by correcting 
for covariance and correlation of endogenous variables across the 
system of equations. 
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Since the data set consisted of pooled time-series and 
cross-section data, the ordering of the observations affected the 
tests for serial correlation. For this test, the variables were 
sorted by bank first and then by year. On the other hand, to 
test for structural change and for heteroskedasticity the 
variables were sorted chronologically and by bank size, 
respectively. Thus, the system of equations was tested for 
structural change first and the observations were separated into 
two periods. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence 
of positive serial correlation for both periods. After the cor-
rection for serial correlation was made, the Park-Glejser test 
made the rejection of the hypothesis of heterosckedastic 
disturbances possible. 
Finally, tests were conducted for the homogeneity conditions 
of the profit function and for the restrictions to simultaneous-
equation estimation that derive from Hotteling's lemma. The 
system of the profit equation and the five input and output 
equations was estimated both imposing restrictions across 
equations and within the profit equation and as a seemingly 
unrelated system of equations without restrictions. The 
restrictions imposed by Hotellings' lemma could not be rejected, 
while the conditions for homogeneity could be maintained for 
prices and for all interaction coefficients, except for those of 
the fixed-input variables. The number of statistically 
significant coefficients increased while their values changed 
considerably when these restrictions were imposed. 
Overview 
The coefficients estimated for the final model were used to 
evaluate price elasticities at the geometric means of the 
variables and to explore the impact of regulation and the 
existence of economies of scale in banking. These elasticities 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4. These results suggest: (1) that 
there may be significant differences in the degree of technical 
efficiency of different types of intermediary, as a consequence 
of the scope of their activity and the extent of their 
specialization; (2) that there may also be differences in the 
price efficiency of development banks, due to their more limited 
emphasis on profit maximization; (3) that although there had been 
a considerable reduction in market concentration and although 
fairly uniform interest rates were observed, this might have 
reflected the enforcement of explicit-price regulations rather 
than competition; (4) that substantial and dispersed implicit 
interest charges may suggest that these banks are not price 
takers in the market for loans, while substantial explicit and 
implicit price competition seems to have characterized the market 
for deposits; and (5) that overall economies of scale seem to 
characterize the technology of Honduran financial intermediaries. 
These and other results are discussed below. 
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Technical Efficiency 
Differences in the value of the intercept parameters of the 
profit function were investigated for the three different kinds 
of financial institution that operate in Honduras: commercial 
banks, savings and loan associations. and development banks. A 
consistently higher level of profits for a particular 
institutional type should result in a statistically significant 
non-zero difference in the value of the intercept parameter. The 
coefficients for the intercept dummy variable were significant at 
the 5 percent level for both savings and loan institutions and 
development banks. This finding of superior technical efficiency 
for the commercial banks may be explained by the adoption of 
superior technologies or by the existence of diversification 
economies that al 1 ow them to reduce their overal 1 risk. While 
the technology of commercial banks allows them to operate with a 
wide range of deposits and loans, the savings and loan 
institutions specialize in mortgage financing only. The 
development banks also lend for restricted purposes only and do 
not actively mobilize deposits from the public as a source of 
funds. That commercial banks are more complete and diversified 
intermediaries allows them to produce a larger output from a 
given set of inputs, compared to the other types of intermediary. 
Price Efficiency in Input and Output Markets 
Dummy variables for the slope poefficients (price variables) 
were included in order to account for differences in price 
efficiency among institutional types. Statistically significant 
differences for the price coefficients were found only for the 
development banks, with respect to demand and savings deposits, 
as well as for loans. This suggests that these institutions were 
less price-efficient than other intermediaries. An explanation 
of this result might be that these public banks are not profit 
maximizers or cost minimizers. Rather, their objective function 
may depend on the volume of credit granted to a particular group 
or for a particular activity. Statistically significant 
differences in these coefficients were not found across the 
privately-owned institutions. There is, however, a possibility 
that this finding does not necessarily indicate equal price 
efficiency. This may be the case because the proxies for prices 
captured only explicit-price components, which were fairly 
uniform across institutions due to regulation. Effective prices 
inclusive of implicit components may vary. substantially, on the 
other hand, if the degrees of price efficiency are different or 
if there is limited competition or market fragmentation. 
Unfortunately, implicit prices were not available. 
I 
I 
l 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Competition in Credit Markets 
Uniform explicit loan yields prevailed in the Honduran 
financial market during the 1975-83 period. Since the proxy for 
loan user costs only captured the explicit components of this 
price, nonsignificant or incorrectly-signed coefficients for 
output prices may indicate that firms do engage in differential 
implicit pricing. The failure of explicit loan user costs to 
explain profits may thus reflect a high dispersion of the 
corresponding effective prices in the market. As shown by Lau 
(1972), this would indicate that firms do not behave as price 
takers in these markets. 
The elasticity of profits with respect to the user costs of 
loans was: 
dlnn/dlnp4 = 0.15*lnp 4 -0.15*lnp 2 -1.33*lnL +1.39*lnD ( 11) 
This elasticity is directly proportional to the explicit 
price of loans (p 4 ) and to the volume of deposits (D), and 
inversely proportional to the volume of loans granted (L) and to 
the explicit price of demand deposits (p 2 ) This seems to 
confirm the hypotheses: (1) that the level of interest-rate 
ceilings has been below market-clearing levels and has reduced 
bank profitability, and (2) that deposit mobilization is a 
profitable activity for the intermediaries. 
Impact of Reserve Requirements 
During the period under analysis, demand deposits did not 
pay explicit interest and did not carry service charges, but 
still generated revenues for the financial institutions. The 
user cost for this variable captures the changes in reserve 
requirements imposed by the Central Bank. An increase in the 
level of reserve requirements, ceteris paribus, increases the 
cost of demand deposits and reduces bank profits. A 
statistically significant and negatively-signed coefficient 
should be observed for this variable. Insignificance or an 
incorrect sign may indicate that the institutions' desired 
reserves were higher than the regulatory requirements. 
The elasticity of profits with respect to the user cost of 
demand deposits was: 
dlnn/dlnp2 = -1.31+0.14*lnp 2-0.15*lnp 4-0.76*lnL+l.09*lnD ( 12) 
This elasticity is directly proportional to the price of 
demand deposits (P2) and to the total volume of deposits (D), and 
inversely proportional to the explicit price and to the volume of 
loans (p 4 and L) of a particular institution. This seems to 
confirm the hypotheses: (1) that an increase in reserve 
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requirements makes this activity less attractive for 
intermediaries, and (2) that an increase in the explicit price 
of loans, ceteris paribus, would make deposit mobilization more 
attractive to intermediaries. 
Competition in Deposit Markets 
Interest payments on savings and time deposits varied across 
financial firms for 1975-83. The significance of the coefficient 
for this price may indicate the bank's willingness to use this as 
a source of loanable funds and the existence of open 
possibilities for expansion and entry into the formal market for 
savings and time deposits. Restrictions on the interest rates 
paid on deposits can represent a barrier to entry if they reduce 
the opportunities for explicit price competition, while allowing 
for prestige and location to play too significant a role in 
consumer' choices. 
The elasticity of profits with respect to the price of 
savings and time deposits was: 
dlnn/dlnp 3 = 0.37*S 3 {13) 
This result suggests that the explicit price paid on savings 
and ti me deposits was re 1 evant only for the development banks 
during the second subperiod (S 3 ). This may indicate: (1) that 
explicit prices did not reflect the level of the effective 
rewards offered in the market for savings, and (2) that savings 
deposits were not an attractive alternative source of funds for 
the banks, perhaps because of the low rediscount rates from the 
Central Bank that prevailed during most of the period. 
The Impact of Inflation 
The impact of the inflation tax was explored by 
incorporating the annual rate of inflation in the price of cash. 
An increase in the rate of inflation increases the price of cash 
and therefore the cost of cash holdings and reserves for the 
intermediaries. 
The elasticity of profits with respect to the cost of 
holding cash was: 
dlnn/dlnp 1 = -0.12*lnp 1 -l.29*lnp 5 (14) 
This result indicates that an increase in the price of cash 
(Pi) resulting from a higher rate of inflation reduces profits 
through a higher opportunity cost of reserves and higher wages 
( p 5) • 
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Economies of Scale 
With a translogarithmic profit function overall economies of 
seal~ are given by: 
dlnx(x.r*Xk)/dXk = E dln(x)/dXk + E d2ln{x)/dln{Xk)dln{Xj) {15) 
where r is the economies of scale parameter, x is the level of 
profits, Xj is the level of variable inputs, and Xk is the level 
of fixea inputs. In terms of elasticities, a 
more-than-proportional increase in profits for a given increase 
in the amounts of the scale variables reflects the existence of 
economies of scale. If the sum of the elasticities equals one, 
the underlying banking technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale, and if this sum is less than one, the production function 
is said to be characterized by diseconomies of scale. 
For Honduras, overall economies of scale seem to 
characterize the production function of banking firms, as the 
computed elasticity for the average size of firm is greater than 
one. However, given differences in the input and product mix of 
these multi-input, multi-output firms, the extent of such 
economies varies across institutional types. It was not 
possible, unfortunately, to differentiate by type of institution 
or by period in this connection, because the rank conditions 
could not be met for the available data set. Nevertheless, it 
was possible to consider both the amounts of services provided as 
well as the amounts of fixed inputs, by measuring them in terms 
of the number of branches and of their size. Interaction 
coefficients among these variables were included in the 
estimation, but statistically significant coefficients were not 
obtained with the model as specified. 
The parameter for economies of scale was separated into 
three components, as follows: 
dlnx/dlnXk = -1.04*lnL + 0.29*lnD + 0.43*FA -0.05*BR. ( 1 6 ) 
where L represents the volume of loans, D the total volume of 
deposits, FA the book value of fixed assets, and BR the number of 
branches. According to this result, overall economies of scale 
seem to result from the expansion of deposit mobilization. This 
suggests that a more active mobilization would be profitable. In 
Honduras, this took place mainly in the form of an expansion of 
limited-service branches in the urban areas. A larger number of 
branches, on the other hand, seems to reduce economies of scale, 
possibly as coordination becomes less effective and as some 
branches operate with unused installed capacity. This suggests 
that network expansion is in general costly for the 
intermediaries, but may be induced by interest-rate restrictions. 
Chavez-Presa obtained a similar result for Mexico. The expansion 
• 
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of credit portfolios, on the other hand, seems to reduce the 
magnitude of the economies of scale. These results may explain 
why in recent years the Honduran financial institutions have not 
expanded their credit portfolios although the volume of deposits 
mobilized increased. Deposit mobilization was still profitable, 
but other investments (inflation hedges, government bonds) were 
more attractive. These results may also indicate that the 
effective yields on loans for the banks are substantially higher 
than the interest rate ceilings. When sizeable transaction costs 
for the borrowers are added, the total cost of funds for bank 
clients differs substantially from the levels proposed by the 
regulators (Cuevas). 
Conclusions 
The role and optimum configuration of financial regulation 
in developing countries is a complex and still unresolved issue 
(McKinnon, 1988; Dooley and Mathieson; Connoly and Gonzalez-
Vega). It involves considerations of market failure, political 
economy, and the nature of financial technologies, many of which 
are beyond the scope of this paper. For over three decades, the 
Central Bank of Honduras has intervened in this country's 
financial markets. These interventions have seldom reflected the 
technical questions debated in this literature. Rather, they 
have been political responses to claims from interest groups to 
the effect that free financial markets do not promote social 
priorities in resource allocation and do not serve distributional 
goals. Despite these interventions, however, substantial 
segments of the population, particularly in the rural areas, 
still do not have access to financial services, and most market 
participants incur in very high transaction costs. In turn, the 
public financial institutions created to solve these problems 
have not been viable, given the high proportions of delinquency 
in their portfolios and operating losses that continuously 
decapitalize them. 
This paper has presented further evidence about the negative 
consequences of regulation when it results in market 
fragmentation. The set of institutions observed, in terms of 
their size distribution and range of services supplied, seems to 
have responded more to the requirements of regulation than to the 
characteristics of banking technologies in a poor, developing 
economy. Interest-rate ceilings and reserve requirements, in 
particular, have introduced incentives for the operation of 
specialized intermediaries, which have been characterized by less 
technical efficiency than the commercial banks. These banks 
which, in turn, have been discouraged by the regulations from 
participation in the target market segments. Given the size of 
the market, however, less specialized intermediaries, with 
greater opportunities for portfolio diversification, seem to be 
more efficient from a technical point of view. Public 
development banks, on the other hand, have lacked price 
' 
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efficiency, due to the nature of their objective functions, which 
have reflected more particular political objectives than the 
desire for financial viability and profit maximization. 
Regulation promoted by the financial intermediaries through 
their influence on the Monetary Board seems to have restricted 
competition. The results suggest that an optimal market 
configuration would be characterized by a larger number of 
participating firms of a smaller size than the largest banks that 
operate at present (Camacho). The observed configuration has 
been sustained therefore, only because of the market segmentation 
introduced through regulation. During the period, the largest 
banks faced considerable rivalry from smaller intermediaries and 
showed less flexibility to adjust to the crisis than their 
smaller counterparts, but resorted to higher leverage in an 
attempt to retain their market shares. In summary, the reduction 
of concentration ratios and the entry of new firms suggests that 
competition has been increasing. However, regulation and greater 
restrictions to entry after the failure and bailing out by the 
Central Bank of a major institution, still stand on the way of a 
perfectly contestable market. 
.. 
Year 
GDP 
1975 -2.0 
1976 18.5 
1977 16.6 
1978 8.7 
1979 2.4 
1980 -3.8 
1981 -3.3 
1982 -2.7 
1983 -2.7 
Table 1 
HONDURAS: Basic Indicators, 1974-1983. 
Annual Rates of Growth 
Prices a/ Total Domestic 
Liquidity Credit 
8.0 
4.9 39.8 26.4 
8.4 18.8 22.4 
5.7 11. 1 9.0 
12.1 -8.1 -4.4 
18.1 -2.9 2.9 
9.3 -0.3 2.7 
9.4 5.5 2.1 
8.9 9.7 -1. 7 
Public-Sector 
Share of 
Domestic Credit 
10.2 
8.7 
9.6 
11. 3 
12.7 
17.3 
20.6 
20.7 
25.3 
Source: Banco Central de Honduras, Boletin Estadistico, 
several years. 
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a/ Computed a the percentage change of the average 
Price Index 
Consumer 
Table 2 
Proxies for Prices and Control Variables. 
Price 
For 
Proxy Control 
variable c 
Cash 1-(1/(l+p)) p 
Demand Deposits 1-((l+R.p)/(l+p)) R 
Savings Time 1-((l+d+R.p)/(l+p)) d 
Loans 1-((l+r)/(l+p)) r 
Labor w w 
Impact of c 
d2 n/ dp.dc 
+ 
Table 3 
HONDURAS: Bank-Profit Function Estimates using Three-stage 
Least-squares with Restrictions across Equations. 
Parameter Standard Approx 
Var Estimate Error t-Ratio Prob> I ti 
aO -6.192702 3.391420 -1.8260 0.0722 
S2 -8.017028 2.924402 -2.7414 0.0078 
83 -7.311125 2.706407 -2.7014 0.0087 
Tl -0.084062 3.033912 -0.0277 0.9780 
T2 -1.798509 4.918186 -0.3657 0.7157 
T3 4.925563 3.127892 1.5747 0.1199 
al -1.817239 1.333831 -1.3624 0.1775 
al Tl -0.351779 0.620303 -0.5671 0.5725 
a1S2 0.903399 1.159412 0.7792 0.4385 
.......-a1r2 -2.000773 1.361034 -1.4700 0.1461 
a1S3 0.500358 1.038966 0.4816 0.6316 
a2 -1.312488 0.769408 -1.7058 0.0925 
a2T1 0.264541 0.433966 0.6096 0.5441 
a2S2 0.151870 0.709727 0.2140 0.8312 
a2T2 -2.107972 0.820813 -2.5681 0.0124 
a2S3 -0.670749 0.914771 -0.7332 0.4659 
a2T3 -0.670749 0.914771 -0.7332 0.4659 
a3 0.014476 0.351742 0.0412 0.9673 
a3T1 0.047198 0.145840 0.3236 0.7472 
a3S2 -1.025695 0.717093 -1.4304 0.1571 
a3T2 0.211185 0.771580 0.2737 0.7851 
a3S3 0.371504 0.222550 1.6693 0.0996 
a3T3 0.371504 0.222550 1.6693 0.0996 
a4 0.286992 0.852831 0.3365 0.7375 
a4T1 -0.368211 0.360020 -1.0228 0.3100 
a4S2 0.816577 0.614522 1.3288 0.1883 
a4T2 -1.236434 0.651786 
-1.8970 0.0620 
a4S3 -0.100557 0.204440 
-0.4919 0.6244 
a4T3 -0.100557 0.204440 
-0.4919 0.6244 
a5 3.828258 1.544722 2.4783 0.0157 
cx5Tl 0.408252 0.779347 0.5238 0.6021 
a5S2 -0.846150 0.885435 
-0.9556 0.3426 
a5T2 5.133993 1.486144 3.4546 0.0009 
cx5S3 -0.100557 0.204440 -0.4919 0.6244 
cx5T3 -0.100557 0.204440 -0.4919 0.6244 
.. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Parameter Standard 
Var Estimate Error t-Ratio Prob> I ti 
aL 2.684999 1.901886 1.4118 0.1625 
cxLTl -1.476050 1.302154 -1.1335 0.2609 
aLS2 -4.649265 2.717097 -1.7111 0.0916 
aLT2 6.036725 2.688973 2.2450 0.0280 
aLS3 -0.754604 1.431212 -0.5272 0.5997 
aLT3 -2.122478 1.745120 -1.2162 0.2280 
aD -0.605088 1.937772 -0.3123 0.7558 
cxDTl 1.224500 1.124058 1.0894 0.2798 
cxDS2 6.758231 3.290712 2.0537 0.0438 
aDT2 -8.290510 3.285055 -2.5237 0.0139 
aDS3 2.578950 1.484321 1.7375 0.0868 
aDT3 1.277784 1.691727 0.7553 0.4526 
~11 -1.119666 0.460535 -2.4312 0.0176 
~13 -0.165199 0.172015 -0.9604 0.3402 
~15 1.284865 0.383485 3.3505 0.0013 
~lL -0.178064 0.265685 -0.6702 0.5050 
~lD -0.008626 0.080935 -0.1066 0.9154 
~22 0.147378 0.052060 2.8309 0.0061 
~24 -0.147378 0.052060 -2.8309 0.0061 
~2L -0.765203 0.433686 -1.7644 0.0821 
~2D 1.088517 0.446142 2.4398 0.0173 
~33 -0.015219 0.021546 -0.7063 0.4824 
~35 0.180417 0.183193 0.9848 0.3281 
~3L -0.047462 0.310630 -0.1528 0.8790 
~3D -0.036003 0.284145 -0.1267 0.8995 
~44 0.147378 0.052060 2.8309 0.0061 
~4L -1.329748 0.526448 -2.5259 0.0138 
~4D 1.390491 0.485963 2.8613 0.0056 
~55 -1.465283 0.374636 -3.9112 0.0002 
~5L 2.320478 0.747094 3.1060 0.0028 
~5D -2.434378 0.694036 -3.5076 0.0008 
~LL -1.037300 0.314972 -3.2933 0.0016 
~DD 0.285956 0.451499 0.6333 0.5286 
~DB 0.380326 0.701223 0.5424 0.5893 
~DL 0.693148 0.630198 1.0999 0.2752 
µ -2.006708 0.844410 
-2.3765 0.0203 
BR -0.156320 0.562140 
-0.2781 0.7818 
FA 0.431682 0.168891 2.5560 0.0128 
FB -0.047927 0.022299 -2.1494 0.0351 
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Table 4 
Price elasticities of the Profit Function. 
Coefficient Value Expected Sign 
Technical Efficiency 
Commercial Banks -6.1 
S&Ls -8.0 
DBs -7.3 
Price Elasticities 
dln7t/dlnpl 5.8 Incorrect 
dln7t/dlnp2 1. 5 Correct 
dln7t/dlnp3 -4.1 Correct 
dln7t/dlnp4 0.4 Correct 
dln7t/dlnp5 -3.6 Correct 
Scale Economies 
dln7t/dlnL -0.7 
dln7t/dlnD 2.9 
dln7t/dlnFI 0.4 
Total 2.5 
APPENDIX 
DEFINITION OF ECONOMETRIC PARAMETERS. 
Coefficient and Variable Definition. 
1t 
ao 
S2 
S3 
Tl 
T2 
T3 
ai 
aL 
aD 
~ii 
~ik 
~iL 
~iD 
~LL 
~LB 
~DD 
~DB 
~DL 
~iSj 
~iTj 
~LTj 
~LSj 
~DTj 
~DSj 
µ 
BR 
FA 
FB 
profits 
intercept coefficient 
intercept dummy variable for S&Ls 
intercept dummy variable for DBs 
intercept dummy variable for CBs for second 
period 
intercept dummy variable for S&Ls for second 
period 
intercept dummy variable for DBs for second 
period 
coefficient for the 
volume of loans 
volume of deposits 
price of input/output 
quadratic term for input/output i 
interaction term for input/output i and 
input/output k 
i 
interaction term for input/output i with loans 
interaction term for input/output i with 
deposits 
quadratic term for loans 
interaction term between loans and number of 
branches 
quadratic term for deposits 
interaction term between deposits and 
branches 
interaction term between loans and deposits 
slope dummy coefficient for input/output i and 
institution type j, first period 
slope dummy coefficient for input/output i and 
institution type j, second period 
dummy variable for loans for institution type 
j, first period 
dummy variable for loans for institution type 
j, second period 
dummy variable for deposits for institution 
type j, first period 
dummy variable for deposits for institution 
type j, second period 
relative number of equivalents firms. 
number of branches 
value of fixed inputs 
interaction coefficient between BR and FA 
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